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INTRODUCTION

In November, 2015, Bobby Newman, at 22 years of age, was accused of
strangling his ex-girlfriend and leaving her body in the woods near the New River
Gorge.' His ex-girlfriend, Shay Hendricks, was rumored to have dumped him a
week prior to her death. The two went to college together in West Virginia and
had both moved to Fayetteville, West Virginia, to begin working. When they
moved together after college, Shay was a CPA in town and Bobby was a raft
guide on the New River.
The main, most condemning evidence the government wanted to use
against him at trial was his cell phone records. The government obtained from
Verizon the call records of his cell phone from the day of the murder. The records
contained incoming and outgoing calls, numbers, times, duration, and cell tower
usage, or "pings." Bobby told the investigating officers that at around 3:50 p.m.
2
on the day of Shay's death, he was at a store in town, shopping for groceries.
However, the cell phone records show that a call made by his phone "pinged"
off of a tower in an area northeast of town, in the vicinity of where Shay was
found.3 When the investigating officer told Bobby that his cell phone was being
used in the area at the time Shay was murdered, he denied it and claimed he was
not there.' The investigating officer was even more concerned when he found
that Shay's phone had connected with the same tower at 3:44 p.m. for
approximately two seconds.'
At the beginning of the 3:50 p.m. call from Bobby's phone, the
southwest sector of the tower (sector 4) was being used.6 During the call,
however, the call switched over to sector 3, indicating to the investigating officer
that Bobby was mobile while talking on the phone.' At trial, the government
called Special Agent William Shute of the FBI as an expert in historical cell site
analysis.' He testified that he examined the call records of the defendant and
victim, along with the cell towers themselves, "to make sure the towers were in
9
the same condition they were in at the time of the crime." He performed practice
calls, observing whether his own phone would reselect to the same tower as the

I
This story is a hypothetical to represent what this Note displays: the need for a stricter
standard in West Virginia on CSLI evidence being used in the courtroom.
2
Starting here, facts are loosely based on State v. Saltzman, 128 So. 3d 1060, 1068 (La. Ct.
App. 2013).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 1069.
5
Id. at 1074.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 1075.
9

Id.
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defendant's and victim's phones on the day of the murder.o Agent Shute
presented a PowerPoint presentation to the jury to "demonstrate the cell towers
used as well as the range of the towers.""
Agent Shute testified that his depiction of the radio frequency of the
towers was a very close representation of the actual cell site. 12 He stated that the
cellular signal he drew "represents . . . the furthest possible distance that the

phone was most likely at during that time."l 3 Further, Agent Shute said that even
when a cell phone is in idle mode, it is sorting through the various cell sites,
putting at the top of a "list" the cell site with the clearest signal.14 On this list are
the cell sites to which the phone will connect when a call is engaged.I Agent
Shute testified that both cell towers to which Bobby's phone connected could not
be used while at the scene of the murder, but could be used within a one-half to
five mile radius from the crime scene. 16
With this story in mind, this Note seeks to address the reliability and
standard of admissibility of Historical Cell Site Location Information ("CSLI").
This Note argues that, with respect to Historical CSLI evidence being used at
trial, West Virginia should adopt the Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael"standard
when evaluating the admissibility of technical expert testimony as governed by
West Virginia Rule of Evidence 702.18 Though a Historical CSLI question has
never faced a West Virginia court, this Note seeks to instigate the discussion in
West Virginia on this fast-growing issue, therefore promoting a heightened
standard for Historical CSLI evidence in the courtroom.
Part II addresses background information regarding the different schools
of thought surrounding Historical CSLI and admissibility standards for expert
evidence in Federal and West Virginia courts. Part III analyzes federal and West
Virginia case law regarding the standard of admissibility of Historical CSLI into
the courtroom without a stricter examination. It further analyzes how a West
Virginia court would decide this issue. Part IV concludes with the thesis of this
Note: West Virginia should adopt the Kumho evidentiary standard for Historical
CSLI. '9

10

Id.

"

Id. at 1076.
Id.

12
13
14
15
16
17

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
526 U.S. 137 (1999); see also infra Section II.B.3.

18

W. VA. R. EviD.

19

Kumho, 526 U.S. 137; see also discussion infra Section II.B.3.

702.
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BACKGROUND

In regards to Historical CSLI, West Virginia should adopt the Kumho
standard when evaluating the admissibility of technical expert testimony as
governed by West Virginia Rule of Evidence 702. Section II.A provides an
overview of Historical CSLI. Court decisions, professors' "expert" opinions,
journal articles, and other sources are discussed to illustrate the differing stances
regarding the reliability of Historical CSLI. Section II.B describes the current
federal law relating to expert evidence admissibility standards under Rule 702.
Section II.C shows examples of parties using Historical CSLI in the courtroom
under the current admissibility standards. Sections II.D and II.E discuss whether
Historical CSLI is "junk science." Finally, Section II.F describes the current
West Virginia admissibility standards for expert testimony in the courtroom and
transitions into the Analysis section, where the Author further argues that West
Virginia should adopt a stricter standard for the admissibility of technical expert
testimony.
HistoricalCell Site Location Information: What Is It?

A.

Historical CSLI, as opposed to real-time location information, identifies
physical cell sites to which a cell phone has sent, or from which it has received,
radio signals. It also includes a record of when each signal was sent or received
over a particular period of time.20 Each cell phone service provider places cell
sites in locations throughout the coverage areas.2 1 When a person makes a call
or sends a message on a cell phone, the phone connects to the cellular network
through a cell site. 22 This connection is made to a cell site that shares the
23
strongest signal, which is usually the one nearest to the caller. If the caller
changes location during a phone call, the cell site changes accordingly.24
As soon as a cell phone connects to a network, the service provider stores
information including the identification and the physical cell site to which the
phone is connected. 25 These bits of information are pieced together to form CSLI
which will "approximate the whereabouts of the cell phone at the particular
points in time in which transmissions are made." 26

20

United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015).

21
22

Id.
Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

Id. (emphasis added). The key word mentioned here, which this Note discusses, is
"approximate."
26
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What Affects the Strength of a Cell Tower?

There are several factors that affect the strength of a cell tower, and,
therefore, affect the reliability of geographical placement based solely on cell
tower connections.27 Antennas and amplifiers are the transmitters through which
a cellular network performs its connections. 28 Antennas are "cell towers that
transmit the signals over a wider area.29 It is the strength of the signal transmitted
via the cell tower that determines how well you can communicate via the
cellphone." 30 Several factors inhibit a cell phone's connection strength and
capabilities to connect to a tower-even if a cell phone tower is in the vicinity,
the connection can be affected.31 Some factors that affect a cell phone connection
to a tower are distance, cell size, interference, poor capacity planning, and lack
of towers.32 These factors affect the reliability of Historical CSLI offered as
expert evidence in the courtroom. 33
There can be an interference with the signal from a cell tower.34 "Cellular
signals travel in a straight line and can only penetrate a limited number of
obstacles." 35 Some major obstacles are "(t]rees, hills, buildings, tunnels, walls[,]
etc." 36 Because there are fewer cell towers in rural areas, there can be a shortage
of towers to which a caller in the area can connect.37 Cell towers are usually
strewn in a honeycomb fashion, which provides the best coverage because if the
caller moves out of range of the cell signal, the call switches over to a
neighboring cell site. 38 However, if there is a lack of towers, the option for a call
to switch to another tower becomes an issue. 3 9
B. FederalStatutes, Rules ofEvidence, and Case Law
In federal court, several statutes, rules of evidence, and cases govern the
admissibility of this type of expert evidence. Under the Required Disclosure of

Beatrice Clayton, Factorsthat Affect the Signal Strength of a Cell Tower, RAPIDIAN (Sept.
11, 2014, 3:11 AM), http://www.therapidian.org/factors-affect-signal-strength-cell-tower.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
27

31
32

33

Id.
Id.

37

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

34
35
36
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Customer Communications or Records, a government entity may obtain cell
phone records from a cell phone provider by one of the following methods: (1)
obtaining a warrant or court order by the court in which the case sits; (2)
receiving the consent of the customer; (3) writing a request that shows the records
are for an investigation regarding telemarketing fraud; or (4) showing a need for
specific information when the entity already has a subpoena to do so. 4 0 These
requirements are only to obtain the records themselves, not the contents of the
communications the customer sent and received.4 1
In discussing the admissibility of Historical CSLI as technical expert
evidence during trial under the current standards, a look at the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the evolution of case law through the "trilogy" is crucial. The
pertinent, primary federal rule is Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs
expert testimony:42

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.43
This rule governs in federal court and was shaped by the following
trilogy of cases."
1.

The Daubert Standard

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,45 the leading case on the
admissibility standard for expert scientific testimony, involved the ingestion of
the drug Bendectin by pregnant women and serious birth defects that followed.46
The plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence, via scientific expert testimony, that

40

18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012).

41

Id.

42

FED. R. EvID. 702.

43

Id.

See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
45
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
46
Id. at 582.
4
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Bendectin can cause birth defects.4 7 The standard for admissibility of expert
scientific evidence at this time was the Frye v. United States4 8 standard: whether
there is a general acceptance of the underlying principle in the pertinent scientific
field.49
The Court in Daubertthrew out the Frye standard and replaced it with a
new standard."o The Court delineated several factors that judges should consider
when determining whether to admit expert evidence under Federal Rule 702."
The suggested factors enumerated by the United States Supreme Court include
four prongs: "whether the theory or technique employed by the expert is
generally accepted in the scientific community; whether it's been subjected to
peer review and publication; whether it can be and has been tested; and whether
the known or potential rate of error is acceptable." 52
The Court reasoned that scientific knowledge must be grounded on more
than "subjective belief or unsupported speculation"; therefore, the admissibility
requirements for this evidence should include a standard of reliability and not
simply a relevance test.53 The Court provided the following example in
describing its reasoning for adopting a more stringent standard than Frye and
general relevance under Rule 702:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide
valid scientific "knowledge" about whether a certain night was
dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist
the trier of fact. However (absent credible grounds supporting
such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain night
will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an
individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on
that night. Rule 702's "helpfulness" standard requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition
to admissibility.54
After laying out the four factors, the Court went on to emphasize that
Rule 702 was meant to be flexible in its application and that the focus of the trial
judge's inquiry "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate."s5 The policy concerns outlined in this decision

47

Id. at 583.

48
49

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.

50

Id. at 587.

51

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. (citingDaubert 509 U.S. at 594).

52
5
54
5

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-91.
Id. at 591-92.
Id. at 594-95.
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included steering juries away from "absurd and irrational pseudoscientific
assertions."S6 The Court's next visit on this topic was four years later, when it
addressed the standard of review for such evidentiary rulings."
2. Joiner: What Is the Appellate Court Standard of Review?
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner," Respondent Joiner worked as an
electrician starting in 1973, which required him to put his hands and arms into a
mineral-oil dielectric fluid to repair breakage." The city of Thomasville,
Georgia, later found that this fluid contained polychlorinated biphenyls
("PCBs"), which are detrimental to human health.60 Joiner fell sick with lung
cancer in 1991.61 He sued, alleging that his exposure to the PCBs (in particular,
the furans and dioxins) promoted his lung cancer.62 Joiner's family had a history
of lung cancer, and he had smoked for eight years." He argued, however, that
the exposure to the PCBs accelerated the cancer.
Joiner produced experts in depositions who testified that "PCBs alone
can promote cancer and that furans and dioxins can also promote cancer." 65 The
district court ruled that the experts failed to show the connection between PCB
exposure and development of cancer and that the expert testimony was
inadmissible for the courtroom because it "did not rise above 'subjective belief
or unsupported speculation."'6 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the expert testimony.67
The Joinercase outlined the standard of appellate review for evidentiary
rulings.6 ' Because the "question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such
an issue of fact," it is reviewable by appellate courts under the abuse of discretion
standard.69 Though the Court in this case solidified the standard of review for

56

Id. at 595.

57

5

See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Id. at 139.

6o

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 139-40.

63

Id. at 139.

6
65

Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 140.

66

Id.

67

Id. at 146-47.

68

Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.

58

69
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evidentiary rulings, the Court in 1999 expanded the Daubert admissibility
standard to technical and other specialized knowledge. 70
3.

Kumho Tire: DaubertStandard Expands to Technical and
Other Specialized Knowledge

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael7' addressed how the Daubert standard
applies to expert testimony that is not scientific. 72 The Supreme Court of the
United States concluded that Daubert'sallocation of "gatekeeping" duties to trial
judges applies to "testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized'
knowledge" as well.73 In this case, a tire of a minivan blew out and caused an
accident, killing one passenger and injuring others. 74 The plaintiffs sued Kumho
Tire and called an expert in "tire failure analysis" named Dennis Carlson, Jr.75
Carlson testified that a "defect in the tire at issue caused its tread to separate from
its carcass." 76 The Court parsed out the issue in this case: "the reasonableness of
using [the expert's] approach, along with Carlson's particular method of
analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the
particularmatter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant."77 The
Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
expert's testimony by relying on the Daubertfactors.
The Supreme Court reasoned that although Daubert applied only to
scientific knowledge, Federal Rule 702 itself does not distinguish between
"scientific," "technical," and "other specialized" knowledge. 79 Because of this
not-so-bright line, the Court reasoned that the connection between Daubert and
technical expert testimony was not a wide leap." It went on to reason that the
gatekeeping function that Daubert implemented upon scientific knowledge
encompassed a general rationale that can easily apply to technical and other
specialized knowledge." The Court pointed out that scientific, technical, and
other specialized knowledge are intertwined. It reasoned that technical and other

72

See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 141.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 142.

75

Id.

7

Id. at 154.

77

Id.

78
79

Id. at 158.
Id. at 147.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 148.

70

7'
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specialized knowledge rests upon scientific principles, like engineering.82 In
essence, the Court recognized that the three types of knowledge listed in the rule
are not mutually exclusive, and, therefore, they should be examined under one
standard: the Daubert standard.83
The Kumho Court further emphasized that the Daubert standard
applying to other types of knowledge as listed in the rule is not a standard that is
being forced upon trial judges; in fact, the Court set out to give trial judges the
option to apply the Daubert factors to knowledge other than science. 84 it
reminded the parties that, just as it stated in Daubert, the Rule 702 inquiry is
flexible: 85
[Daubert] made clear that its list of factors was meant to be
helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all
necessarily apply even in every instance in which reliability of
scientific testimony is challenged. It might not be surprising in
a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a scientific
witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the
particular application at issue may never previously have
interested any scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the
presence of Daubert's general acceptance factor help show that
an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks
reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any socalled generally accepted principles of astrology or
necromancy. 86
Because of this established, yet loose, framework, the Court applied the
Daubert factors to technical and other specialized knowledge by granting trial
judges the gatekeeping function under Rule 702.87
C. HistoricalCSLI in the Courtroom UsingExpert Testimony
During the trial of Aaron Graham and Eric Jordan, in United States v.
Graham,"the Appellants "objected to proposed testimony regarding CSLI from
a Sprint/Nextel records custodian and from an FBI agent who investigated the
case." 89 They argued that the proposed testimony admitted by the government
was an "impermissible expert opinion" because of unreliability and lack of
82

Id.

83

Id. at 149.

8

86

Id. at 150.
Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)).
Id. at 151.

8

Id. at 158.

85

8

796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015).

89

Id. at 341.
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precision. 90 However, both the district court and Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the government's lay testimony that the Historical CSLI gained
against the Appellants was "precise enough, at minimum, to support reasonable
inferences about [their] locations at specific points in time." 91 This evidence was
ultimately used to establish the Appellants' locations around the times of the
robberies for which they were charged.9 2 Although the Fourth Circuit did hold
that the government obtained the Historical CSLI through an unreasonable
search under a separate Fourth Amendment issue, it affirmed the "district court's
denial of the suppression motion because, in obtaining the records, the
government acted in good-faith reliance on the [Stored Communications Act]
and the court orders issued under that statute."93 This Fourth Circuit case is an
example of how some courts use Historical CSLI to approximate the locations of
people, generally. Next, the theory of granulization has not been widely adopted
by many courts.
1.

The Theory of Granulization

Although many believe that cell records are reliable if presented by
experts in the courtroom, others, like United States District Judge Joan H.
Lefkow and Michael Cherry, experts in historical cell site analysis, disagree. 94
In United States v. Evans,95 the court discussed the reliability and admissibility
of CSLI under Rule 702 and Daubert.96 In this case, Defendant Antonio Evans
was charged with kidnapping and conspiracy. 9 7 The evidence against Evans
purported that "calls placed from defendant Antonio Evans' cellphone could
have come from his aunt's house, where the victim was thought to have been
held for ransom." 98 The court, however, held that the expert's testimony on the
cell phone evidence theory of "granulization" was unreliable. 99 Because Special
Agent Raschke (Raschke) offered little proof as to how granulization worked

90

Id.

91

Id. at 351.

92

Id. at 342-43.

Id. at 343.
See Mark Hansen, Prosecutors'Use of Mobile Phone Tracking Is 'Junk Science,' Critics
Say,
A.B.A.
J.
(June
1,
2013,
8:50
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/prosecutors-use_of mobile-phonetrackingisjun
k_sciencecriticssay/.
95
892 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
96
See id. It should be noted that the court relies on the Kumho standard here as well, since it
is technical expert testimony.
97
Hansen, supra note 94.
9

94

98

Id.

99

Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 955-56.
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while assuring the court that he and other agents use this technique with zero
0
percent error, Judge Lefkow did not allow admission of the evidence at issue.
Granulization, as explained by Raschke, is a theory that pinpoints the
location of a cell phone by "identiflying] (1) the physical location of the cell sites
used by the phone during the relevant time period; (2) the specific antenna used
at each cell site; and (3) the direction of the antenna's coverage."' Then,
Raschke "estimate[d] the range of each antenna's coverage based on the
proximity of the tower to other towers in the region."l 0 2 The angle of the antenna
and its signal strength are key factors in determining whether a cell phone can
connect in that specific area.' 03 Using his training and experience, Raschke
asserted that he could establish where the coverage area of the tower overlapped
with the coverage area of another and possibly place a person in that overlap.104
Using the theory of granulization, Raschke "testified that he could
estimate the general location of Evans's cell phone during an 18 minute period
(from 12:54 p.m. to 1:12 p.m.) on April 24, 2010, during which time Evans's
phone used two cell towers to place nine calls."' This general location of the
phone "could have come from" the place where the victim was being held for
ransom.1 06 The government succeeded in introducing maps Raschke created to
show the location of cell towers that Evans's phone used throughout the course
of the crime.'o7
The Evans court analyzed several factors that rendered Raschke's
granulization theory unreliable. 0 I First, when "determining the coverage overlap
of the two towers used by Evans's cell phone on August 24, 2010, [Raschke]
assumed that Evans's cell phone used the towers closest to it at the time of the
calls." 109 There are many reasons why a phone does not connect to the nearest
tower, including a building obstructing access and busy network traffic that
reroutes the phone connection to a different tower." 0 Because Raschke presented
no scientific calculations that "[e]stimat[ed] the coverage area of radio frequency
waves," the court found that his conclusions lacked a necessary connection
proving that his phone pinged off the nearest towers."'

10o

Hansen, supra note 94.

101

Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 952.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104
105

Id.
Id.

106

Id. (emphasis added).

107

Id. at 953.
Id. at 956-57.

108
109
11

Id. at 956.
Id.

III

Id.
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Second, the Evans court found the granulization theory to be unreliable
because it has never been tested by the scientific community.1 12 The court
recalled the importance of the Daubertfactor that requires the proffered scientific
theory to be tested by the scientific method in order to be deemed reliable for its
admission in the courtroom. 113 This type of scrutiny is important because it
"increases the likelihood that the substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected." 1 4 Because the granulization theory "has not been subject to scientific
testing or formal peer review and has not been generally accepted in the scientific
community," the Evans court found the theory to be unreliable and therefore
excluded the testimony under Rule 702."' Raschke's testimony regarding how
cellular networks operate, however, was admissible under Rule 702.116 Raschke
simply was not permitted to apply the principles to the facts of the case.117
D. Junk Science?

Michael Cherry, an expert in historical cell site analysis, calls cell tower
tracking an "easily disproved technique" and "junk science."" He has stated,
"No one who understands the relevant science would ever claim that data from a
single cell tower can reliably be used to specify the location of a caller at the time
a particular call is made."ll 9 Edward J. Imwinkelried, a law professor at
University of California, Davis, said some of the current CSLI interpretation is
"nonsense" and that it is not as foolproof as many wish to believe.1 20
Imwinkelried has argued that "records can tell you whether a [caller] who has
denied being in the coverage area of a particular tower at a given time was lying,"
but that these records cannot pinpoint the exact coverage area that the caller was
in at that time.12 1 "[I]n some areas, the caller could have been anywhere within a
420-square-mile vicinity of a particular tower." 22 Imwinkelried and other
experts on Historical CSLI have said "it takes GPS tracking or simultaneous ping
information from at least three different locations to locate or track a caller and
to determine his or her latitude and longitude." 1 23

113

Id.
Id.

114

Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)).

115

Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 957.

116

Id. at 955.
Id.
Hansen, supra note 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Michael Cherry et al., Cell Tower Junk Science, 95 JUDICATURE 151 (2012).

112

117
118
119
120
121
122

123
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In a few cases, the government has fought to introduce faulty cell tower
evidence. 124 For example, one Florida newspaper covered a case in which a jury
returned a verdict of not guilty for a defendant who was accused of first-degree
murder. 125 Perhaps the jury was not persuaded by the state's Historical CSLI
evidence. The state's expert witness gave a PowerPoint presentation showing
that the "pings" off of each cell tower proved the defendant's movements from
126
Ocala to Miami, Florida, after the murder of his cousin. However, in the retrial
of the case, the defense cross-examined the state's expert who admitted that
"other towers would pick up a call if there were tower updates or maintenance
going on."l 27 The expert could not testify that tower updates or maintenance was
not happening at the time of the calls. 128 The expert further testified on crossexamination that at least 20 different factors determine which tower connects to
the caller, and he could not testify that the other factors were not in play at the
time of the call. 129 As this case demonstrates, "[j]uries are willing to listen to
30
arguments about the limitations of cell tower tracking-and acquit."l
In a second case, the defendant was charged with seven crimes, facing
145 years in prison. 13 ' The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and among its
findings was the conclusion that the cell tower evidence produced by the state
was unreliable. 3 2 The state had produced cell phone tower ping data against the
defendant, purporting to show that the defendant left a trail between his home
and the crime scene.' 33 The pings, however, were taken from single cell towers
instead of multiple simultaneous tower connections which would more clearly
pinpoint a location.134 The defense showed that "a cell phone call does not have
to use the closest tower or the nearest tower" when the phone is connecting to a
call.13 The defense expert explained to the jury that the most accurate way to
pinpoint a person's location is through Global Positional System ("GPS"), which
uses satellites.' 36 The defense expert also reminded the jury that the Federal

124

Id.

125

Id. at 152; see also Suevon Lee, Jury Finds Brown.Not Guilty of Murder, OCALA STAR

BANNER (May 11, 2011, 2:34 PM), http://www.ocala.com/news/20110511/jury-finds-brown-not-

guilty-of-murder.
126
Cherry et al., supra note 123, at 152; see also Lee, supra note 125.
127
Cherry et al., supra note 123, at 152.
128

Id.

129
130

Id.
Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.
Id.
Id.

133
134

135
136

Id.
Id.
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Communications Commission ("FCC") requires all cell phones to contain GPS
chips for 911 emergency purposes. 13 7 The defense then argued that "[i]f the
methodology proposed by the state was at all accurate, there would be no need
for the government to require GPS chips in phones." 1 38
The implications of using faulty Historic CSLI can be unnerving. In fact,
the growing awareness regarding the preferred limitation on using this evidence
in the courtroom had the opposite effect on the FBI in 2014: the FBI trained over
5,000 police investigators on the methodology.' 39 Though most cell towers have
three antennas, the depiction of tower coverage areas differs significantly
between law enforcement and cellular experts.' 40 Cell tower analysts "draw
coverage areas as wedges radiating 120 degrees from each [and] say the range is
general[ly] 1-2 miles." 41 In opposition to the wedge format, "[p]hone company
coverage maps show that radio waves don't behave uniformly" and that "[t]hey
can be blocked by topography and other obstacles." 4 2 If blocked, the radio
waves can "leak" outside of the 120-degree area. 14 in addition to the mapping
differences, cell phone experts say that "when a phone is in range of more than
one tower, an algorithm chooses a tower based on factors such as signal strength,
tariffs and traffic already using that tower."' 44
E.

Not Junk Science?

In contrast, another court found an FBI Special Agent's testimony
regarding the "location of the cell towers, the sectors used for each call, and the
general location where the cell phones must have been when they connected to
each tower" to be a product of reliable principles and methods.1 45 In United
States v. Jones,146 the defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess with the
intent to distribute cocaine.1 4 7 The government obtained four months of the
defendant's Historic CSLI to track his movements.1 48
137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Tom Jackson, Experts say law enforcement's use of cellphone records
can be inaccurate,
POST (June 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/experts-say-law-

WASH.

enforcements-use-of-cellphone-records-can-be-inaccurate/2014/06/27/028be93c-faf3-11
Oa55b81f48ce.story.html?hpid=zl&utm term=.9111413afcO2.
140
141

Id.
Id.

143

Id.
Id.

'"

Id.

145

United States v. Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2013).
918 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).

142

146

147
148

e3-932c-

Id. at 2.

Id.
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Special Agent Scott Eicher compiled maps showing his cell site analysis
of the defendant's phone from the following two sources:
the call records of the cell phone companies that were produced
pursuant to court orders, which identify the particular tower and
sector the phones connected to at the beginning and end of each
call[;] and (2) cell tower lists provided to law enforcement by
the cell phone companies, which specify the location of their cell
towers, including the GPS coordinates for each tower and the
direction that the sectors point in for those towers. 149
On the maps, Agent Eicher indicated (1) all of the cell towers in the area,
(2) the cell towers to which the phones connected, and (3) "the specific 120
0
[degree] sector of the tower that was used for the call."` The court agreed that
Agent Eicher's testimony was based upon reliable methodology, citing other
federal courts that also accept the use of phone location records for historical
tracking purposes."s' The court also said that all "assumptions" Agent Eicher
made about the signal strength from a given cell tower go toward the weight of
his testimony, not its reliability.' 52
The Fifth Circuit ruled that another FBI Agent's testimony of historical
153
cell site analysis was reliable and, therefore, admissible evidence. This court
said that it would consider the agent's methodology reliable based on the
following reasoning: (1) the agent had "extensive knowledge and experience" in
the field, (2) the agent had used the technique over 100 times with zero percent
error, (3) the agent had taught courses on this subject, and (4) the technique had
154
been accepted in other federal courts as reliable.
1 " a Michigan case, the court addressed
In United States v. Pembrook,
whether a witness's testimony satisfied the requirements of the expert evidence
rule and Daubert.156 Testimony that contributes a "log show[ing] that a
particular phone connected to a particular tower at a particular time," thus
"infer[ring] that a phone was within that tower's coverage area at that time,"
has been found to be based upon reliable methods.157 In Pembrook, the
defendants were on trial for two robberies and the crimes associated with those

149

Id. at 3.

150

Id.

'5

Id. at 5.

152

Id.

15
154

15
156
157

United States v. Schaffer, 439 Fed. App'x 344, 346 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 347.
119 F. Supp. 3d 577 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
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robberies.' The defense raised four arguments: (1) the government failed to
provide details describing the bases and reasons for the expert's conclusion,
which "depriv[ed] the Court of the ability to determine whether his methods are
reliable;" (2) the expert's opinion was based on an untested theory-the
"theory of granulization;" (3) the expert's testimony was not admissible as Rule
701 lay-witness testimony; and (4) the defense required additional discovery in
order to cross-examine the witness at trial. 159
First, the Pembrookcourt determined that Hess, the expert witness in the
case, based his testimony on reliable methods. 6 0 The court drew a distinction
between Hess's theory and the theory of granulization as discussed in Evans.'"'
Unlike the expert in Evans, Hess was not attempting to place a particular cell
phone at a particular pinpoint location (i.e. the defendant's aunt's basement). 162
Instead, Hess's testimony showed four cell phones move from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, to the Grand Rapids and West Bloomfield areas, and back to
Philadelphia between April 21, 2014, and April 23, 2014.163 This testimony was
offered to show the traveling pattern of the four phones, not the exact location of
each, around the times the robberies were committed.164
The court, through its gatekeeping function, found Hess's methodology
sufficient, reasoning that (1) each cell phone must connect to a cell tower for
each phone call; (2) each cell tower is stationary and has a limited coverage area;
and (3) the service provider records the connection to the cell tower-the phone,
the time, and the tower. 6 5 This method was introduced to the court by Hess in
his "Basic Principles Utilized in Record Analysis."' 66
One issue the defendant raised with regard to the expert's testimony,
however, was his source of information upon which he based his Basic Principles
Utilized in Record Analysis.167 In particular, the defendant asserted the same
argument that many other defendants maintain: simply because the phone
connects to a certain tower does not mean that the phone connected to the closest
one.' 68 Hess asserted that as a phone travels while a call is in session, the phone
will choose a new tower based upon signal strength and the "neighbor list."' 6 9

158

Id. at 579.

159

Id. at 596.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.

160
161
162

163
164
165
I66
167

168
169

Id.
Id.
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The neighbor list is a list of specific towers that are controlled by the service
provider, and Hess alleged that a phone would not randomly connect to a
different (closer) tower unless it is on that list.' 70 Hess also emphasized that there
are more cell towers in urban areas than in rural areas, and a cell tower usually
spans three, 120-degree sectors."'
The court agreed with the defendant that Hess did not adequately show
the source of his reasoning and held that the government must "describe . .. the
bases and reasons for [the expert's] opinions."l7 2 The court ordered the
government to submit a supplemental brief to its Rule 16 disclosure to explain
Hess's source. 17 3
F. West VirginiaStandardfor the Admissibility ofExpert Testimony
In West Virginia, testimony by expert witnesses is governed by Rule 702
Virginia Rules of Evidence:
West
of the
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) In addition to the requirements in subsection (a), expert
testimony based on a novel scientific theory, principle,
methodology, or procedure is admissible only if:
1. the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
2. the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and
the principles and
3. the expert has reliably applied 174
methods to the facts of the case.
Essentially, Rule 702 as discussed in Daubert"granted circuit judges the
discretion and authority to determine whether scientific evidence is trustworthy,
even if the technique involved has not yet won general scientific acclaim.""
West Virginia follows this standard.176
Until Daubert, West Virginia used the Frye test regarding expert
testimony, which "excluded such innovative testimony unless the techniques
involved had earned 'general acceptance' in the relevant scientific

172

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CluM. P. 16(a)(1)(G)).

173

Id. at 599.

174

W. VA. R. EvID. 702.

175

Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 180 (W. Va. 1995).

176

See id.

170
171
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community." 1 7 The Frye test was ruled to be too rigid to fit the liberal intent of
Rule 702, for both the federal and West Virginia rules."17 Now, in West Virginia,
with regard to scientific testimony, a judge must give "a preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology ... properly
can be applied to the facts in issue."179
1. Daubertand Wilt
In 1993, West Virginia adopted the Daubert standard for the admission
of scientific expert testimony in the case Wilt v. Buracker.8 0 In this case, the
court held:
[W]e believe that Daubert is directed at situations where the
scientific or technical basis for the expert testimony cannot be
judicially noticed and a hearing must be held to determine its
reliability. We conclude that Daubert'sanalysis of Federal Rule
702 should be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert
testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence. The trial court's initial inquiry must consider whether
the testimony is based on an assertion or inference derived from
scientific methodology. Moreover, the testimony must be
relevant to a fact at issue. Further assessment should then be
made in regard to the expert testimony's reliability by
considering its underlying scientific methodology and
reasoning. This includes an assessment of (a) whether the
scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have been tested;
(b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (c) whether the scientific theory's actual
or potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific
theory is generally accepted within the scientific community.1"'
Though the Daubert standard is set in West Virginia for scientific
evidence, the reliability of Historical CSLI has not yet been addressed in the
West Virginia courts.182
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided that, on appeal,
"[w]hen a circuit court excludes expert testimony as unreliable under the

177

Id. at 179.

178

Id.

179

Id. at 180 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993)).
443 S.E.2d 196, 196 (W. Va. 1993).

180

181

Id. at 203.
This Note addresses what the procedure should be in a West Virginia court if a party seeks
to introduce Historical CSLI at trial.
182
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[Daubertand Wilt] gatekeeper analysis, we will review the circuit court's method
of conducting the analysis de novo."183 The court also discussed its procedure for
a trial court when determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony:
When a trial court is called upon to determine the admissibility
of scientific expert testimony, in deciding the "reliability" prong
of admissibility the focus of the trial court's inquiry is limited to
determining whether the expert employed a methodology that is
recognized in the scientific community for rendering an opinion
on the subject under consideration. If the methodology is
recognized in the scientific community, the court should then
determine whether the expert correctly applied the methodology
to render his or her opinion. If these two factors are satisfied,
and the testimony has been found to be relevant, and the expert
is qualified, the expert may testify at trial.184
Evidentiary hearings ("Daubert/Wilt hearings") were implemented to
determine whether an expert's testimony will be admissible.' 85 The two-part test
in determining whether the testimony will be admitted into evidence is: "(1) is
the witness [qualified as] an expert; and, if so, (2) is the expert's testimony
relevant and reliable?"1 8 6
In a restatement of the Gentry case, the court enumerated the two-step
inquiry for determining who is an expert." "First, a circuit court must determine
whether the proposed expert (a) meets the minimal educational or experiential
qualifications (b) in a field that is relevant to the subject under investigation (c)
which will assist the trier of fact." 18 8 The second prong requires the court to
"determine that the expert's area of expertise covers the particular opinion as to
which the expert seeks to testify." 89
Second, as the court stated in Wilt, West Virginia courts are to follow the
Daubert factors when determining whether the scientific testimony is relevant
and reliable.'" The goal of the procedures implemented by West Virginia courts
is "not to decide whether the proffered evidence is right, but whether the science
is valid enough to be reliable." 1 9' Courts are cautioned, however, "not to exclude

183

Syl. Pt. 1, Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc., 753 S.E.2d 275, 277 (W. Va. 2013).

184

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

185
186

Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.

187

Id.

'

Id. (quoting Gentry v. Magnum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 186 (W. Va. 1995)).

189

Id.

190

Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993).
Gentry v. Magnum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 182 (W. Va. 1995) (emphasis omitted).

191
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debatable scientific evidence without affording the proponent of the evidence
adequate opportunity to defend its admissibility." 1 92
2.

Watson: A Missed Opportunity

In Watson v. INCO Alloys International,Inc.,193 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia addressed a question regarding the admissibility of
technical expert testimony. 194 Plaintiff Watson died as a result of a lifttruck
accident-he was operating the lifttruck during employment for INCO Alloys
when the lifttruck fell off a tractor trailer and crushed him.195 Mrs. Watson, the
deceased's wife, sued INCO Alloys.' 9 6 A professional engineer, John Sevart, was
solicited to testify as an expert witness for Watson regarding a defective design
of the lifttruck.'" The trial court excluded the testimony on the basis that it was
classified as scientific and, therefore, must meet the requirements as set forth in
Gentry.'98 However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that
the trial court clearly erred in finding that the engineering testimony was
scientific and subject to the Wilt/Daubertanalysis of scientific testimony.' 99
The court decided that the standard for the engineer's testimony was a
Rule 702(a) determination, which requires the expert's knowledge to assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or fact in issue.200 The court also
agreed with Mrs. Watson's stance that "any argument regarding the methodology
utilized by [the] expert in developing his opinions go[es] to the weight of his
testimony and not its admissibility."201 The Watson court restated that the first
consideration regarding expert evidence is whether the testimony is "derived
from the scientific methodology." 20 2 If it is, and if the evidence is relevant, then
the next hurdle to overcome is a series of four requirements: whether the
scientific theory (1) can be or has been tested; (2) has been peer reviewed; (3)
has a known "actual or potential rate of error;" and (4) is "generally accepted
within the scientific community." 203

192
193
194
195
196
197
198

199
200
201
202
203

San Francisco v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 485, 495 (W. Va. 2007).
545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001).

Id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.; W. VA. R. EviD. 702(a).
Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 299.
Id.
Id. (quoting Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993)).
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the
engineer's testimony was not scientific at all and, therefore, should not have been
scrutinized under the hurdles set forth in Daubert and adopted by the court in
Wilt. 2 04 The court reiterated the standard for expert testimony in West Virginia
by highlighting the three major requirements: "(1) the witness must be an expert;
(2) the expert must testify to scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; and
(3) the expert testimony must assist the trier of fact."20 5 Because Mr. Sevart's
technical expert testimony was based on "his education, years of experience,
review of over one thousand accidents involving the type of machinery herein
involved, and his review of reports involving the instant accident," the court
found that the testimony met the requirements under Rule 702(a) and was,
therefore, admissible technical expert testimony. 206
III.

ANALYSIS

West Virginia should adopt the Kumho standard when evaluating
whether Historical CSLI evidence is admissible at trial under West Virginia Rule
of Evidence 702. This Part provides an analysis of the law and Historical CSLI
schools of thought as provided in the previous part. Section III.A discusses the
implications of admitting Historical CSLI into the courtroom without a stricter
examination. Section III.B unfolds the policies behind the federal case law
discussed in Part II and their importance. Sections ILI.C & HI.D discuss the
current West Virginia treatment of expert technical evidence and what this would
mean if a court were to answer a Historical CSLI question. Section III.E further
discusses implications of this expert evidence on jury decisions. Section III.F
provides supplemental questions a judge could ask before allowing Historical
CSLI into the courtroom. Though West Virginia has yet to be confronted with a
Historical CSLI case, it is a topic that is quickly growing and facing courts
throughout our nation. It is only a matter of time until West Virginia is faced
with this issue.
A.

Implications of the Admission ofHistoricalCSLI in West Virginia
Courts

Before discussing the current standards of admissibility for technical
evidence, it is important to recall the complexity of Historical CSLI.207 Aside
from the fact that the reliability of this topic is highly disputed when it comes to
using it as expert evidence in a courtroom, 208 Historical CSLI and how cell
204

Id.

205

Id. at 302 (quoting Gentry v. Magnum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 183 (W. Va. 1995)).
Id. at 300.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section I.D.

206
207
208
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towers perform are difficult concepts to understand. For this reason, and because
of West Virginia's terrain, 20 9 when the issue arises in a West Virginia court, the
standard should be raised when a party is moving to admit expert witness
testimony on cell tower evidence.
As stated in Section II.A. 1, there are several factors that affect the
strength of a cell tower. 2 10 Here, these obstructions and interferences are
important because of West Virginia's natural terrain and rural areas.2 11 West
Virginia's topography is notoriously mountainous, which could seriously affect
the connection of a cell phone to a cell tower and, therefore, the reliability of
Historical CSLI as evidence.212 Since a mountain can affect the connection of a
cell phone to the nearest cell tower, this is an important factor to consider when
discussing the admissibility of Historical CSLI in a West Virginia court.213 In
addition to the mountainous regions in West Virginia, the state also has a large
amount of rural areas. A West Virginia court should be aware that rural areas
also affect cell phone connections to cell towers because of a possible shortage
of towers.2 14 These are a few reasons why the standard in West Virginia
regarding admissibility of this evidence should be more stringent.
B. Policy and Reasoning of the FederalCases Applied to HistoricalCSLI
in West Virginia
It is important to acknowledge the primary policy concern underlying
the Daubert opinion: to ensure that junk science and other unreliable scientific
principles do not persuade a jury into making a misinformed decision. 2 15 The
United States Supreme Court set the standard for expert scientific testimony in
Daubert to keep out of the courtroom expert opinions that are based upon
"subjective belief or unsupported speculation." 2 16 In addition, the Court reasoned
that the new standard breathes life into what Rule 702 already asked for: the
requirement of a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
209
See supra Section IIA. 1. West Virginia's highest point, which is also the highest peak in
the Allegheny Mountains, is at Spruce Knob, sitting at 4,861 feet. West Virginia LegislatureKid's
Page:
Fun
Facts
About
West
Virginia,
W.
VA.
LEGISLATURE,
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/educational/Kids Page/funfacts.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
West Virginia's lowest point is the Potomac River, which sits at 247 feet above sea level at
Harper's Ferry. Id. West Virginia's mountains are as wild and wonderful as ever. Let's go
Mountaineers!
210
See supra Section IIA. 1; Clayton, supra note 27.

211

Allegheny Plateau, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/us/allegheny-

plateau.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
212
Clayton, supra note 27; see also supra Section IIA.l.
213
Clayton, supra note 27; see also supra Section I.A.l.
214
Clayton, supra note 27; see also supra Section H.A. 1.
215
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
216
Id. at 599.
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precondition to admissibility." 2 17 In West Virginia, this same connection needs
to be made between the methods and principles of Historical CSLI and the
relevance before it is presented to a jury. This underlying purpose of keeping out
unsupported speculation, in more than just scientific testimony, was carried
through the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Joinerand Kumho.2 1 8
The Court's decision in Joiner provided that the standard of appellate
review for evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. 21 9 However, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided to review the exclusion of expert
testimony under the de novo standard. 22 0 Kumho acted as an expansion of the
Court's standard set forth in Daubert.22 1 The expansion of Daubert's
gatekeeping duties to non-scientific knowledge imposes upon the trial judge a
duty to ensure the evidence the jury hears is reliable: the threshold balances both
scientific and non-scientific expert witness testimony as equal.222 This threshold
has become increasingly important for technical experts to meet because of the
wide variety of specialties in the areas of technical and other specialized
knowledge. The Kumho decision in relation to Historical CSLI evidence was
crucial because it suggested that the trial judge ensure the technical expert's
methods are reliable before jumping to conclude that the expert is reliable simply
because he has an opinion that will assist the trier of fact.223
Because Historical CSLI is a complex topic, as discussed in the previous
Section, it is important for a trial judge to use this stricter gatekeeping function
to parse out the method of the expert's opinion in order to continue following
Daubert's underlying policy: to keep out unsupported speculation. 224 It is
especially important for courts to seriously consider the methodology of expert
testimony when dealing with Historical CSLI evidence not only because there
are opposing views and different methodologies, 225 but because a lay juror will
likely rely more heavily on theories unfamiliar to him than simpler ones.
Therefore, it logically follows that if a juror will heavily rely upon an expert
regarding complex theories and technical data, then the data being testified to
should be checked as far back as its underlying methods, which is what the

Id. at 592.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997).
219
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143.
220
Syl. Pt. 1, Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc., 753 S.E.2d 275, 277 (W. Va. 2013).
221
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
222
See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
223
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141; see also discussion supra Section II.B.3.
224
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see also discussion supra
Section II.B.
225
Some methodologies are considered reliable while others are not. See also discussionsupra
Sections II.D-E.
217
218
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Kumho decision provides.226 Just as the Court decided in Daubert and Kumho,
the standard for admissibility of expert evidence is a flexible inquiry; therefore,
if a federal court were presented with a Historical CSLI issue, then the trial judge
would have the ability to admit the evidence even if one of the Daubert factors
were missing. 227
C. Query: What Would Happen in a West Virginia Court Under the
CurrentLegal Standards?
West Virginia's standard for the admissibility of expert evidence aligns
with the federal standard only for scientific expert witness testimony as provided
in Daubert.228 For scientific expert testimony, the line of inquiry a trial judge
may use is found in Gentry.22 9 For expert testimony regarding technical and other
specialized knowledge, the line of inquiry a trial judge may use is found in West
Virginia Rule 702(a) and Watson.230
For technical expert testimony, the standard in West Virginia is still a
702(a) inquiry, which is whether the expert's knowledge would assist the trier of
fact in understanding the evidence or fact in issue.2 3' This standard is basically a
Rule 401 relevance standard 232 and, thus, is a low threshold to meet. The key
missing fact with this standard is the methodology of the expert's opinion-the
"how-did-you-get-there" inquiry.
In reading the Watson case, one cannot help but think that it would have
been a good opportunity for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to
look to the United States Supreme Court's Kumho case in deciding whether the
engineer's technical expert opinion would survive the gatekeeping standards just
as the trial court had implemented. 233 According to the Watson court, an
engineer's testimony will be considered "technical" testimony under Rule 702

Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141; see also discussionsupra Section I.B.3; Harvey Brown & Melissa
Davis, Eight Gatesfor Expert Witnesses: Fifteen Years Later, 52 Hous. L. REv. 1, 33 n.190 (2014)
("The disparate expertise of the witness and the average juror tends to produce a natural inclination
to accept the expert testimony as gospel. . . .") (quoting Dunnington v. State, 740 S.W.2d 896, 898
(Tex. App. 1987).
227
See discussionsupra Section II.B.3.
228
Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993); see also discussion supra Section
II.F.1.
229
Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 184 (W. Va. 1995).
230
Watson v. INCO Alloys Int'l Inc., 545 S.E.2d 294, 306 (W. Va. 2001); see also discussion
supra Section II.F.2.
231
Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 306.
232
W. VA. R. EviD. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.").
233
See discussionsupra Section II.F.2.
226
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even though the area of study is based upon scientific principles.23 4 Following
this logic, it is likely an expert on cell phone tower evidence, like Historical
CSLI, would also be considered a technical expert in a West Virginia court rather
than a scientific expert.
The current West Virginia law regarding admissibility of technical and
other specialized knowledge under Rule 702 is a low standard for admissibility,
especially considering the weight juries give to experts who take the stand.235
The Watson court set forth a standard that, when analyzed through the lens of a
lay juror, could bring a shocking outcome when the evidence being admitted is
something as foreign as Historical CSLI. 2 36 The fact that "any argument
regarding the methodology utilized by [the] expert in developing his opinions
go[es] to the weight of his testimony and not its admissibility" is absurd if the
court itself will refrain from examining the methodology before admitting
technical expert evidence under 702(a). 2 37 How will the jury be required to
examine the methodology of the expert's testimony when it will be admitted by
the court without having the same scrutiny?
D.

What a West Virginia Court Should Do When Faced with a Historical
CSLI Question

Because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not yet
addressed the question presented by this Note, it is important to look to precedent
in other jurisdictions for guidance. When a West Virginia court is presented with

Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 302.
235
Brown & Davis, supra note 226; see also 4 Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness
Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 54 (Autumn 1989).
A central tenet underlying the developing legal position on expert
psychological testimony is that jurors are not fully aware of scientific
knowledge about memory processes. It is assumed that jurors are not fully
sensitive to the factors that influence eye witness memory . . . . If jurors are
not adequately sensitive to factors that influence the accuracy of eye witness
identifications, they cannot effectively evaluate eyewitness evidence.
Id. Though this Note does not discuss eyewitness evidence, this Article brings an interesting point.
The same argument can be made for Historical CSLI expert testimony (or any expert testimony)if a jury does not fully understand the factors that influence the expert's testimony about the
technical process to which he is testifying, the jury cannot adequately evaluate the expert's
testimony. Here, however, the argument is not being made that juries are incapable of
understanding Historical CSLI when an expert is explaining the process. To be admitted into the
courtroom, the "process" should be reviewed more heavily in West Virginia than a simple 702(a)
standard in order to ensure it is reliable enough for the jury to make a determination of fact. In
order to adequately understand the expert's outcome and give weight to the testimony, there must
be a connection between the underlying methods of what the evidence is and what it is purported
to show at trial.
236
Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 299.
234

237

Id.
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the question of whether Historical CSLI should be admitted into the courtroom
under Rule 702, it should look to Kumho and its reasoning in adopting the
Daubert standard for scientific testimony for technical and other specialized
knowledge.
Looking back to Bobby Newman's case from Part I, if a West Virginia
court heard the case, the standard for admissibility of the technical expert
testimony would be Watson and 702(a).2 38 Under current West Virginia law, the
trial judge would ask whether the expert's testimony would assist the trier of fact
in determining whether Bobby was near the scene of the murder (i.e. had
something to do with Shay's murder).239 This fact is determinative to the
outcome of the case and is, therefore, extremely important. Because this fact,
determined by the fact finder, is so crucial, the admissibility of the evidence that
will help the fact finder make this decision should be scrutinized under a stricter
standard than the 702(a) test, which boils down to a 401 relevance standard.2 40
Under current West Virginia law, the judge would skip the inquiry of whether
the methods of the expert's testimony are reliable. The question about the
methodology of Agent Shute's testimony regarding the cell tower evidence
would go to its weight, not its admissibility.2 4 1 Because of this, the connection is
missing: Will the testimony regarding the placement of Bobby's phone during
the times of the calls assist the trier of fact in determining a material issue in the
case? Maybe. But how do we know if it will assist the trier of fact if it is not
reliable enough for the jury to use when making the decision? Under current
West Virginia law, this is unanswered in the realm of expert testimony for
technical and other specialized knowledge.
Following Watson, a court would likely find that Agent Shute is (1) an
expert, (2) testifying to technical knowledge, and (3) providing testimony that
will assist the trier of fact.242 The details regarding the cell records and Agent
Shute's opinion would likely be admitted to the jury without a strict inquiry. 2 43
This.means that the jury would hear the expert testify to the pings, that the cell
records place Bobby within five miles of the crime scene, and Agent Shute's
opinion regarding how cell towers communicate. 2 4 Agent Shute's method of
using his phone to test the cell towers and whether his phone would reselect to
the same cell towers as did Bobby's phone on the day of the murder would not
be tested by the judge-this opinion would go straight to the jury for it to decide

See discussion supra Section II.F.2.
See discussion supra Part I.
240
W. VA. R. EvID. 702(a), 401.
241
Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 299; see also discussion supra Part I.
242
Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 303 (quoting Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 183 (W. Va.
1995)).
243
W. VA. R. EviD. 702.
244
See discussion supra Part I.
238

239
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how much weight to give the evidence. However, West Virginia courts place
weight on experts' educational achievements and experience. 245 Therefore,
because Agent Shute is a special agent from the FBI, these credentials would
likely pass the court's examination.
E.

In a Jurisdiction Where Kumho Is Adopted for HistoricalCSLI Expert

Evidence, What Is the Outcome?
If West Virginia adopted Kumho to determine the admissibility of
Historical CSLI expert evidence, a court would inquire further about Agent
Shute's testimony.24 6 A court would employ the following standard and look to
the following factors before admitting Agent Shute's technical expert witness
testimony before the jury: (1) Is the witness an expert?; (2) Is the theory or
technique relied upon by the expert generally accepted in the scientific
community?; (3) Has it been subjected to peer review and publication?; (4) Has
it been, or can it be, tested?; (5) Is the known or potential error rate acceptable?;
and (5) Will it assist the trier of fact? 247 This standard is more stringent for the
admissibility of the expert testimony because it tests the underlying theory more
than the current standard.
Following the Kumho standard, the trial judge would address several
concerns regarding Agent Shute's testimony. The judge would ask whether, on
the day of the murder, Bobby's phone acted in the same way as Agent Shute's
phone did by connecting to the same towers that Agent Shute's phone did during
his practice calls. The judge would question the reliability of the PowerPoint
presentation demonstrating the range of the cell towers. Next, the judge would
scrutinize the "list" a cell phone makes when sorting through cell sites. The judge
would inquire whether there are factors that could affect the "strongest" tower
also being the "closest." The judge would further determine whether each of
these things is generally accepted in the scientific community and that each has
been subjected to peer review and publication. Each assertion listed above should
have been, or can be, tested, and the potential error rate of each should be
acceptable. If West Virginia adopts the Kumho standard for Historical CSLI,
these inquiries would have to be determined by the trial judge before the
admission of the expert witness testimony regarding the Historical CSLI
evidence.24 8
The outcome of adopting Kumho for Historical CSLI is more favorable
to the West Virginia justice system because it requires the trial judge to engage
the gatekeeping responsibility that is already in place for scientific expert
245
See Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc., 753 S.E.2d 275, 279 (W. Va. 2013) (quoting Gentry, 466
S.E.2d at 186.
246
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
247
248

Id. at 147, 149-50.
Id. at 152.
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testimony.2 4 9 The purpose of a gatekeeper is to ensure that juries hear reliable
evidence. If a jury is to make a fact decision, how can we expect it to do so
without deciding with reliable evidence? Because it is crucial for the evidence
being heard by a jury to be reliable in order for it to make a decision based upon
accurate facts, West Virginia courts should consider bolstering the threshold for
this type of evidence.
Take, for example, a products liability case in West Virginia. The
plaintiff calls an expert to show how a furnace is installed in a home. Most lay
people do not know how to install this unit, but they are aware that many homes
have a furnace, the filters need changed, and if there is a problem with a furnace,
they call a heating and air repairer. However, with Historical CSLI and other
complex technical or specialized knowledge, a juror would likely put more
weight on the testimony. This was heavily argued by the petitioner in the amicus
briefs filed in Kumho: "Among the 'difficulties' that Judge Hand noted were that
an expert frequently ends up 'confusing' the jurors and effectively 'take[s] the
jury's place if they believe him."'250 This shows the need for a higher standard
for technical and other specialized knowledge like Historical CSLI.
In the petitioner's brief, he went on to argue that "'because experts often
deal with esoteric matters of great complexity,' jurors frequently are incapable
of 'critically evaluating the bases for an expert's testimony' and too often give
'unquestioning deference to expert opinion."'2 5 1 With this in mind, it makes
sense to adopt the gatekeeping function for expert evidence other than scientific,
which is exactly what the Court did in Kumho and what West Virginia courts
should do so when faced with a Historical CSLI expert.2 52 The petitioner went
on, pointing out that cross-examination and showing weakness in opposing
expert testimony is ineffective.253 "Because of the expert's 'aura of infallibility,'
even when jurors have a 'basis for questioning the expert's reliability, [they] may
be disinclined to do so."'2 5 4 Due to this "infallibility," juries put more weight on
expert evidence, which could be dangerous to a party if the evidence is not
reliable. To protect parties to litigation and the system in general, West Virginia
should consider the Kumho standard when evaluating an expert witness for
Historical CLSI.

See Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993).
Brief for Petitioner at 52, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 971709), 1998 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 652 (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
ConsiderationsRegarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40,50 (1901)).
251
Id. at 52-53 (quoting C. WRIGHT & V. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6262,
at 182-83 (1997)).
252
See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
253
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 250, at 54.
254
Id. (quoting C. WRIGHT & V. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6262, at 183
(1997)).
249

250
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F. Questions to Ask RegardingReliability

The following questions could be helpful to a trial judge weighing the
reliability of Historical CSLI for admissibility. How precise is CSLI in this
particular setting? 255 As mentioned above, geography and topography may affect
how precise this data is. 256 If the phone is in range of several towers when a caller
makes a call, does it automatically connect with the tower that is the closest? 257
As some data suggests, the closest tower is not always the tower to which a call
connects.25 8 What extrinsic factors affect which tower a phone connects to? 259
What records of Historical CSLI are stored by the service provider? 26 0 IS
Historical CSLI recorded when the data is being used for applications like
Facebook, Email, etc.? 26 1 A detailed record of this data would provide additional
factors for the jury to sift through when determining whether this evidence can
pinpoint the caller in a specific place. Is the phone equipped with the necessities
that are required for tracking its historical location? 26 2 In answering these
questions, a West Virginia court is bound to discuss the reliability of Historical
CSLI, which is a necessity under Daubertand Rule 702.
IV.

CONCLUSION

West Virginia should adopt the Kumho standard when evaluating the
admissibility of Historical CSLI evidence. As the current law stands, West
Virginia fails to adequately protect parties by applying the minimal standard of
Rule 702(a) and the Rule 401 relevance test to technical and other specialized
knowledge. West Virginia courts, having adopted Daubert for scientific expert
testimony, should examine Historical CSLI by adopting and using Kumho to
scrutinize Historical CSLI under Rule 702. When a Historical CSLI question
presents itself in West Virginia, the state's adoption of Kumho would provide an
additional safeguard to prevent the jury from hearing unreliable Historical CSLI
evidence.
The Kumho standard for technical expert testimony, in placing the
gatekeeping role in the hands of the trial judge, ensures that the parties will use
reliable evidence in proving their case to the jury. Because it is crucial to the fact
finder for all expert evidence to be thoroughly scanned and pronounced reliable,

255

In re United States, 40 F. Supp. 3d 89, 93 (D.D.C. 2014).

256

See discussion supra Section III.A.
In re United States, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 93.

257
258

See discussion supra Section II.D.

259

In re United States, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 93.

260

Id.
Id.
Id.
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using Kumho's approach to Historical CSLI is the way to ensure the expert
evidence is based upon reliable methods. Historical CSLI technical expert
testimony should be relied upon by the trier of fact when (1) it is based upon
"sufficient facts or data," (2) it is a result of "reliable principles and methods,"
and (3) those principles and methods were "reliably applied" to the facts of the
case. 263
Though this Note barely touched on a policy argument, the reasoning
surrounding a decision to adopt a stricter standard for Historical CSLI evidence
falls in line with public policy. Since juries put more weight on expert testimony
of which they have no prior knowledge and in which they have no experience,
the gatekeeping role of the judge is important. Expert testimony regarding
Historical CSLI evidence that is (1) tested, (2) subjected to peer review and
publication, (3) accepted with a rate of error within the proper standards, and (4)
generally accepted within the scientific community is the test that a West
Virginia court should use when evaluating Historical CSLI expert testimony.
Alexandra C. Smith*

263

W. VA. R. EviD. 702(b).
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